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SECTION 1983, IMMUNITY, AND THE PUBLIC DEFENDER:
THE MISAPPLICATION OF IMBLER V PACHTMAN

ROBINSON V. BERGSTROM

579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was designed to implement the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.' Section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act, presently codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983,2 permits a private individual to bring a civil action for damages3 against any person
who acts "under color of state law ' 4 and deprives the private individual
of a right or privilege guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
Initially, section 1983 was narrowly construed by the courts to include
only actions by state officials or acts authorized by state law as actions
"under color of state law." 5 More recently, under color of state law has
been more broadly interpreted by the courts to include actions of many
private persons and institutions not readily identifiable as state entities.6 This is most often the case where the private individual or state
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides, in pertinent part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws ....
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
egislation, the provisions of this article.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as section 1983] states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. Section 1983 provides for relief in the form of damages for deprivation of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Injunctive relief may be obtained by invoking the pertinent provision or amendment of the United States Constitution. See Dellinger, Of Rights and
Remedies. The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972).
4. In claims brought under section 1983, " 'under color' of law has consistently been treated
as the same thing as the state action required under the Fourteenth Amendment." United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
5. See Comment, Section 1983 and the New Supreme Court. Cutting the Civil Rights Act
Down to Size, 15 DuQ. L. REV. 49, 51 (1976). For the United States Supreme Court's original
stance on this issue, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 182-87 (1961). But see Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overrules Monroe as to absolute immunity of local
governments in section 1983 actions).
6. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (staff of state mental hospital); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (public school board members); Chalfant v. Wilmington Institute,
574 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1978) (public library board members); Potenza v. Schoessling, 541 F.2d 670
(7th Cir. 1976) (private individuals conspiring with state officials); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d
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institution is state regulated or the state has statutorily delegated its
authority to the private individual or institution. 7
The extension of section 1983 claims to ostensibly private persons
and institutions which perform public functions poses a curious problem: whether a person employed by a state entity is not acting under
color of state law because that person exercises a private function. This
is the situation of the public defender, whose office is statutorily created
and state funded but who maintains a private attorney-client relationship which is free from any and all state regulation.
In Robinson v. Bergstrom,8 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that the public defender is a "state instrumentality" 9 who acts under color of state law.' 0 But the Seventh Circuit,
relying on the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Imbler v.
Pachtman t which concerned state prosecutors, found the public defender to be "absolutely immune"' 2 from section 1983 claims.
This comment will examine the development of section 1983
claims against the public defender, the defense of immunity often allowed by the courts to defeat such claims, and the application by some
courts of the immunity defense to a section 1983 claim without first
locating the requisite state action. Finally, this comment will assess the
Seventh Circuit's opinion in Robinson v. Bergstrom.13 It will be shown
that while the Seventh Circuit correctly found the public defender to be
acting under color of state law, the court incorrectly analogized Imbler
v. Pachtman14 and misapplied absolute immunity to the public defender.
HISTORY OF SECTION

1983

ACTIONS AGAINST PUBLIC DEFENDERS

The Public Defender and State Action
The section 1983 claim against the public defender is a relatively
1311 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978) (prison guard); Robinson v. Jordan, 494
F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1974) (physician employed as county health official); Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d
151 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974) (prison doctor); Meredith v. Allen County War
Memorial Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968) (hospital commission); Fidtler v. Hendricks,
317 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (prison superintendent).
7. See note 108 infra.
8. 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
9. Id. at 408.
10. Act of July 6, 1933, L. 1933, p. 430, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, §§ 5601-5608 (1977) and Act
of June 21, 1929, L. 1929, p. 306, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, §§ 5609 (1977), create the office of public
defender, enumerate duties and provide for office quarters and compensation.
11. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
12. 579 F.2d at 411.
13. 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
14. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

new phenomenon. 15 Prior to the United States Supreme Court holding
in Gideon v. Wainwright,16 which required appointed counsel for indigent defendants, there were very few public defenders mandated under
state statute. 17 Instead, if the indigent defendant was represented at
all,' 8 the courts relied on the privately retained attorney or, occasionally, the court-appointed attorney, neither of whom was found by the
courts to be acting under color of state law for section 1983 purposes. 19
Similarly, the private attorney who volunteered to represent an indi20
gent client was found not to be acting under color of state law.

Gideon v. Wainwright2' established the right to counsel for indigent
defendants in criminal proceedings. 22 In other cases, the United States
Supreme Court recognized the indigent's right to appeal2 3 and the right
to adequate appellate review in criminal proceedings. 24 In Anders v.
California,2 5 the Court mandated the right to a meaningful appeal 26 for
the indigent defendant and required the attorney representing the indigent to file a brief if it was at least arguable that the appeal contained
merit. 27 The states created the office of public defender to meet these
requirements of an indigent's right to a fair trial and appeal as mandated by the United States Supreme Court. Most states enacted statutes providing for the appointment of public defenders, office space

15. See generally Gozansky & Kertz, Private Lawyers' Liability under 42 .S. C § 1983, 24
EMORY L.J. 959 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Gozansky]; McCormack, Federalismand Section 1983:
Limitationson JudicialEnforcement of ConstitutionalProtections,PartI, 60 VA. L. REV. 1 (1974).
16. 372 U.S. 335, 340-45 (1963).
17. While public defender offices could be funded by the state prior to Gideon, there was no
mandatory requirement to do so.
18. See 372 U.S. at 338. Many indigent clients were forced to defend themselves as best they
could.
19. For cases where the privately retained attorney was found not to act under color of state
law, see Nelson v. Stratton, 469 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,410 U.S. 957 (1973); Skolnick v. Martin, 317 F.2d 855, 857 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,375 U.S. 908 (1963) (plaintiff
alleged mistreatment by attorney during taking of deposition in civil suit). For an analysis of this
issue, see Gozansky, supra note 15.
For cases where the court-appointed attorney was found not to act under color of state law,
see O'Brien v. Colbath, 465 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Mulligan v. Schlachter,
389 F.2d 231, 233 (6th Cir. 1968) (per curiam); Hill v. Lewis, 361 F. Supp. 813, 818 (E.D. Ark.
1973); Vance v. Robinson, 292 F. Supp. 786, 788 (W.D.N.C. 1968).
20. See Thomas v. Howard, 455 F.2d 228, 229 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
21. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
22. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972), extended the right of counsel to all prosecutions of offenses punishable by imprisonment.
23. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S 353 (1963).
24. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The Court in Griffin held that "[diestitute defendId. at
ants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money.
19.
25. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
26. Id. at 742.
27. Id. at 744.
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28
and compensation.
Although the public defender became state sanctioned, the courts
did not readily find that the public defender acted under color of state
law when representing the indigent client. 29 Various courts held that
the public defender did not act under color of state law by virtue of the
private nature of the attorney-client relationship and therefore dismissed the claim. 30 One court even found the public defender to be an
3
independent contractor. '
Nor did the fact that the public defender received state funds create state action according to some courts. In Peake v. County of
Philadelphia,3 2 a section 1983 claim by an indigent client against the
Voluntary Defenders Association (VDA), a public defender group, was
struck down. Although the VDA was partially funded by the state, the
court found that the VDA did not possess any power derived from the
state statute and thus did not act under color of state law. 33 The public
defender's office was funded by the state in Espinoza v. Rogers,34 yet
the court found that the state statutes "in no way attempt to control or
otherwise influence the professional judgment of a lawyer employed as
a public defender. '35 According to the Espinoza court, mere employment as a public defender did not constitute acting under color of state
law.

36

Immunity as a Defense to a Section 1983 Claim
The other method utilized by the courts to defeat a section 1983
claim against a public defender was to declare the public defender immune from such a claim. Section 1983 states that any person who acts
under color of state law to deprive an individual of constitutional rights
may be liable for damages. 37 Thus, section 1983 on its face does not
allow the application of immunity to defeat a claim.3 8 The United
28.

See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE

§§ 27700-27712 (West 1978); PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 16,

§§ 9960.1-9960.13 (Purdon 1978).
29. Ironically, the courts were expansively interpreting the section 1983 state action prerequisite in other areas. See generally cases cited note 6 supra.
30. See Clark v. Brandom, 415 F. Supp. 883, 884 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Berryman v. Shuster, 405
F. Supp. 1346 (W.D. Okla. 1975); United States ex rel. Wood v. Blacker, 335 F. Supp. 43, 44
(D.N.J. 1971).
31. Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 362 A.2d 871 (1975) (malpractice action against
public defender).
32. 280 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (per curiam).
33. Id. at 854.
34. 470 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir. 1972).
35. Id. at 1174-75.
36. Id. at 1175.
37. For the text of section 1983, see note 2 supra.
38. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-19 (1976).
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States Supreme Court, however, in Tenney v. Brandhove,39 held that
immunities and defenses may be applied in certain instances to defeat a
section 1983 claim. 40 Thus, the courts have applied immunity to a section 1983 claim on a case-by-case basis, eventually carving out excep4
tions to section 1983 liability for certain classes of state officials. '
There are two basic types of immunity which a court may apply to a
section 1983 claim. These are absolute (judicial and quasi-judicial) and
42
qualified immunity.
Judicial immunity is the absolute immunity provided to judges
acting within the scope of their official duties. 43 Recently, the United
States Supreme Court, in Stump v. Sparkman,44 reemphasized the absolute quality of judicial immunity when the judge acts within his or her
official capacity, even if the judge acts maliciously or in excess of au45
thority.
Quasi-judicial immunity, the other form of absolute immunity, has
been granted by the courts to those persons found to have judicial-like
duties. 46 The rationale for the extension of this immunity is that these
individuals make discretionary judgments on the basis of evidence
presented to them similar to those of a judge exercising judicial authority. The state prosecutor is the most recent official to arrive under the
quasi-judicial umbrella. In Imbler v. Pachtman,47 the United States
39. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
40. Id. at 376-77. But see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243-49 (1974) (Congress did not
intend to incorporate all common law immunities into section 1983).
41. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). But see Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overrules Monroe as to absolute immunity of local governments in section
1983 actions). For an argument in favor of a strict reading of section 1983 which would allow no
immunity applications, see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 382-83 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
42. For general background on judicial and quasi-judicial immunity, see Fullwood, Immunity Under 42 US C. Section 1983,7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 39 (1975); McCormack & Kilpatrick, Immunities of State Officials Under Section 1983, 8 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 65 (1976); Note, Liability of Public
Officers to Suit Under the Civil Rights Acts, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 614 (1946); Note, Quasi-Judicial
Immunity: Its Scope and Limitationsin Section 1983 Actions, 1976 DUKE L.J. 95. See notes 50-54
infra and accompanying text for general background on qualified immunity.
43. By definition, judicial immunity applies only to a section 1983 claim against a judge. See
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). Judicial immunity is preserved in the case of a
section 1983 claim. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
44. 435 U.S. 349 (1978). In Stump, the United States Supreme Court upheld a state court
judge's approval of a mother's petition to have her " 'somewhat retarded' " fifteen-year-old
daughter sterilized without informing the daughter. Id. at 351. The Court found that although
the judge may have acted maliciously and in excess of his authority, the judge will be protected by
absolute immunity unless he has acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction. Id. at 362-64.
45. Id. at 356.
46. See Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), affrdper curiam, 275 U.S. 503, 506 (1927)
(United States Attorney General); Rhodes v. Meyer, 225 F. Supp. 80 (D. Neb. 1963), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 915 (1964) (state attorney general); Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65, 69 (1880) (grand jurors);
Hunter v. Mathis, 40 Ind. 356, 358 (1872) (grand jurors).
47. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). For an analysis of the Imbler opinion, see Note, Prosecutor Not
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Supreme Court compared the role of a state prosecutor to that of a
judge and found that the state prosecutor, by virtue of the ability to
determine who should be brought to trial and when, performed a judicial-like function. 48 Thus, the Court reasoned that the state prosecutor
must be absolutely immune from any section 1983 claim so that he or
she may proceed with the "vigorous and fearless performance of the
prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the crim49
inal justice system."
The other basic type of immunity granted by the courts in a section 1983 claim is qualified immunity. It is granted to those officials of
the state who possess non-judicial authority but who must be protected
in certain instances from claims which unnecessarily interfere with
their duties.50 The United States Supreme Court has granted qualified
immunity to policemen, 5' public school board members, 52 and state executive officers. 53 Qualified immunity is narrower in scope than the
immunity enjoyed by holders of absolute immunity because it is
granted to these officials only when they carry out their duties in good
faith, 54 whereas there is no good faith requirement under the doctrine
of absolute immunity.
The distinction between absolute immunity and qualified immunity should not be overlooked. Not only will absolute immunity protect the official in apparently every aspect of his or her official duties, 55
it will defeat any claim against the official at the outset of the proceedings. 56 Once absolute immunity is granted, the suit is dismissed, no
Amenable to Civil Rights Suit, 62 A.B.A.J. 642 (1976); Note, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 152 (1976); Comment, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 217 (1976). Prior to 1mbler, the state prosecutor was ordinarily granted
qualified immunity. See Arensman v. Brown, 430 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1970).
48. 424 U.S. at 430.
49. ld. at 427-28. Justices White, Brennan and Marshall, concurring in 1mbler, would grant
only qualified immunity to a state prosecutor who is faced with a claim based on "unconstitutional suppression of evidence" because to do otherwise would "injure the judicial process and
interfere with Congress' purpose in enacting section 1983." Id. at 433 (White, J., concurring).
50. For background information on this area of immunity, see Kattan, Knocking on WoodSome Thoughts on the Immunities ofState Officials to Civil Rights Damage Actions, 30 VAND. L.
REV. 941 (1977); Note, 20 VILL. L. REV. 1057 (1975); Note, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1103 (1975).

51. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
52. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
53. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). See also Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555
(1978) (qualified immunity granted to prison official).
54. Correspondingly, any activity which is outside official duty will not be protected by qualified immunity in a section 1983 claim. For general background on the good faith requirement in
qualified immunity, see Note, Immunity of Federal and State Judgesfrom Civil Suit-Timefor a
Qualified lmmunity?, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727 (1977); Note, Accountabilityfor Government
Misconduct: Limiting Qualfied Immunity and the Good Faith Defense, 49 TEMPLE L.Q. 938 (1976).
55. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
56. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976).
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matter how egregious the behavior of the official. 57 Qualified immunity, on the other hand, may be applied only after the case has been
presented on its merits and the official has been found to have carried
out his or her duties in good faith.5 8
Public Defenders and the Immunity Defense in a Section 1983 Action."
Approaches Taken by the United States Courts ofAppeals
Two circuits, relying on Imbler v. Pachtman,59 have granted absolute immunity to the public defender. 60 However, in so doing, these
courts have failed initially to establish the requisite state action upon
which a section 1983 claim is, in part, based.
The Ninth Circuit relied on 1mbler in deciding Miller v. Barilla.6'
In Miller, the public defender was charged with depriving the indigent
client of the sixth amendment right to trial 62 for having breached a plea
bargain. 63 The court held that the public defender, like the state prosecutor in Imbler, was absolutely immune from section 1983 claims for
acts within the "judicial" function of a public defender. 64 The state
action question of whether the public defender had acted under color
of state law was left unsettled, although the Ninth Circuit suggested
65
that state action appeared to be tenuous.
57. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
58. It is important to note that an individual normally protected by quasi-judicial immunity
may receive only qualified immunity if the act alleged is considered to be outside the individual's
quasi-judicial function. See Hilliard v. Williams, 465 F.2d 1212, 1217 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1029 (1972); Brown v. Dunne, 409 F.2d 341, 343-44 (7th Cir. 1969). For example, state
prosecutors who defame a defendant in public, Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 1976)
(per curiam); enter a conspiracy, Holton v. Boman, 493 F.2d 1176, 1178 (7th Cir. 1974); engage in
a raid for the purpose of committing murder, Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); or, induce sheriffs to coerce a confession from a
suspect, Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 537-38 (9th Cir. 1965) and Lewis v. Brautigam, 227
F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955) may find these acts to be outside the "absolute" quasi-judicial immunity
afforded to them under 1mbler.
59. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
60. See Miller v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648, 649 (9th Cir. 1977) and Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899,
901 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1977). For a discussion in favor of the grant of
absolute immunity to the public defender, see Nakles, Criminal Defense Lawyers. The Casefor
Absolute Immunity From Civil Liability, 81 DICK. L. REV. 229 (1976).
61. 549 F.2d 648, 649 (9th Cir. 1977).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusations; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
63. The indigent client in Miller alleged that the public defender made false representations
that the plea bargain would be honored, thereby inducing the indigent to accept the plea bargain
which was not respected. 549 F.2d at 648.
64. Id. at 649.
65. Id. at 650.
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State action was also left undecided by the Fourth Circuit in Minns
v. Paul,66 where a public defender had allegedly violated the indigent
client's fourteenth amendment rights by failing to respond to the indigent's request for aid in preparing a writ of habeas corpus. 67 The
Fourth Circuit relied on the 1mbler analogy and held that the public
defender was absolutely immune from a section 1983 claim. 68 The
Minns court identified two policy reasons in support of the absolute
immunity grant to the public defender. These were the need to recruit
able attorneys as public defenders and the desire to encourage the public defender to use "unfettered discretion . . .to assign priorities be-

69
tween indigent litigants, and to make strategic decisions.
The Fourth Circuit, in Minns, introduced another consideration in
favor of a grant of absolute immunity to the public defender-the possibility of "frivolous" section 1983 claims. 70 According to the court,
"indigents more frequently attempt to litigate [section 19831 claims
which are patently without merit than do non-indigent parties. '' 7' In
fact, the court found the Minns case to be a "classic example"7 2 of such
a frivolous section 1983 claim since Minns' only complaint was that the
legal services which he sought were not forthcoming within the thirtyseven days which elapsed between the request for aid in preparing the
73
writ of habeas corpus and the filing of the sectionl983 complaint.

Two circuits, prior to the decision in Imbler v. Pachtman,7 4 had
determined that qualified immunity affords adequate protection to a
public defender in a section 1983 claim. Again, however, these courts
66. 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1977). For an analysis of the
implications of Minns, see Note, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 620 (1977); Note, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 390
(1977); Note, 63 VA. L. REV. 607 (1977); Comment, 1977 WASH. U. L. Q. 155.
67. For the text of the fourteenth amendment, see note I supra. For a discussion of the use of
the writ of habeas corpus, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-82 (1976). The court in Minns
stated the facts surrounding the alleged deprivation of a constitutional right as follows:
Between the 8th and 14th of January, 1975, Minns telephoned Paul to request legal
assistance in preparing a petition for habeas corpus; during that conversation, Minns was
assured that Paul would be back in contact with him within a week. On January 18,
1975, the plaintiff sent a formal written request for legal assistance to the defendant. At
Minns' insistence, on February 5, 1975, the Assistant Superintendent of the Correctional
Unit telephoned Paul to discover the reasons why the defendant had not acted upon the
plaintiff's requests for legal assistance. On February 6, 1975, Minns sent a second letter
to the defendant, once again requesting legal assistance. Paul has never responded in
any way to these requests.
542 F.2d at 900.
68. The Minns court stated: "Because we agree [that the public defender is immune] ... we
do not reach the question of whether Minns acted under color of state law." Id.
69. Id. at 901.
70. Id. at 902.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
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had determined that the public defender has qualified immunity without establishing the requisite state action necessary for a valid section
1983 claim.
In Brown v. Joseph,75 an indigent client at arraignment refused the
services of his court-appointed public defender. At trial for robbery,
the public defender represented the indigent who pleaded guilty and
was sentenced. 76 The indigent subsequently brought a section 1983 action against the public defender for allegedly violating his constitutional right to trial. 77 The Third Circuit, in Brown, found the public
78
defender to have a qualified immunity similar to state prosecutors.
79
The state action question was left undecided.
Prior to Robinson v. Bergstrom,80 the sole case in the Seventh Circuit concerning a section 1983 claim against a public defender was John
v. Hurt.8 1 In John, an indigent state prisoner filed apro se complaint
alleging that the public defender who represented him at trial had deprived him of his sixth amendment rights. 82 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit did not specifically rule on the state action question. Rather,
the court determined that even were the public defender deemed to be
acting under color of state law, the public defender, as a matter of law,
83
was immune from liability for damages.
The Seventh Circuit in John found the public defender to have a
qualified immunity similar to that of state prosecutors. 84 Again, public
policy considerations of recruitment and performance were cited for
extending immunity to the public defender. But the court, in John,
found that a grant of qualified rather than absolute immunity was sufficient to "encourage . . . free exercise of discretion in the performance
75. 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
76. Id. at 1046. Apparently, the indigent, although represented at trial by the public defender, did not wish to be so represented nor, in retrospect, to plead guilty.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1048-49. Although the court in Brown does not identify the immunity as qualified,
the immunity granted was the same immunity given state prosecutors at that time-qualified immunity.
79. The court stated that "we do not deem it necessary to decide the question (citation omitted) because in the view we take, even assuming the color of law requirement to have been met,
we hold that a County Public Defender, created under the Pennsylvania statute, enjoys immunity
from liability." Id. at 1048.
80. 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
81. 489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973).
82. Id. at 787. See note 62 supra for the text of the sixth amendment. The pro se complaint
in John was drafted by the indigent client and made vague allegations that the public defender
had been incompetent by failing "to move to suppress damaging evidence... land] call all witnesses in plaintiffs behalf." 489 F.2d at 787.
83. Id. at 788.
84. Id John was decided before the United States Supreme Court decision in 1mbler granted
absolute immunity to state prosecutors. 424 U.S. at 427-28.
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of professional obligations, as well as aid in the recruitment of able
men and women for public defender positions. ' 85 Five years after
John, the issue of immunity for public defenders was once again before
the Seventh Circuit.
ROBINSON v. BERGSTROM

Facts of the Case
In Robinson v. Bergstrom,86 Earl Robinson, an indigent, was represented in a trial for murder by John C. Bergstrom, a part-time assistant
public defender for Champaign County, Illinois. In his capacity as assistant public defender, Bergstrom was compensated by the state. In a
jury trial on September 27, 1968, Robinson was convicted. Shortly
thereafter, Bergstrom was reappointed in his capacity as public defender to represent Robinson on appeal. Bergstrom did not prosecute
Robinson's appeal 87 and resigned his position as public defender in
1973. Robinson's appeal was filed in May 1974 by the Illinois State
Appellate Defender's Office 88 and was subsequently denied.
Because the delay between Robinson's conviction and the filing of
the appeal was approximately five and one half years, Robinson maintained that he was denied access to various prison programs and prevented from filing a federal habeas corpus petition because all state
remedies had not been exhausted. 89 In reply, Bergstrom testified that
an error in judgment regarding his caseload was the primary reason for
the delay.90
In 1973, Robinson filed a section 1983 claim against Bergstrom. 9'
Robinson alleged that Bergstrom had acted under color of state law,
thereby depriving Robinson of his rights under the sixth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution. 92 The district court
found no state action on the part of Bergstrom and dismissed the complaint. 93 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that it was at least argu85. 489 F.2d at 788.
86. 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
87. Id. at 402. Bergstrom did file notice of appeal. The only other actions taken by Bergstrom were two apparent visits to Robinson in prison in 1972. Id.
88. See The State Appellate Defender Act, P.A. 77-2633, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 208-1208-11 (1977).
89. 579 F.2d at 403. For a discussion of the use of a writ of habeas corpus, see Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-82 (1976).
90. 579 F.2d at 402. Bergstrom testified that his caseload was approximately six hundred to
nine hundred cases per year. Id.
91. Id. at 403.
92. Id. For the pertinent provisions of the texts of the fourteenth and sixth amendments to
the United States Constitution, see notes I and 62 supra.
93. 579 F.2d at 403.
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able that a public defender, acting within his capacity as a public
servant, falls within the meaning of "under color of state law." 94 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. 95 On remand,
the district court held that Bergstrom had not acted under color of state
law when he represented Robinson as a public defender. 96 Robinson
again appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
Reasoning of the Court
In its second review of the Robinson case, the Seventh Circuit held
that the traditional procedure of granting either absolute or qualified
immunity to the public defender prior to the determination of the state
action question was incorrect. 97 The court rejected the procedure established in Miller v. Barilla,98 Minns v. Paul,99 and Brown v. Joseph 10 0
0 2
0
and found that its own handling of John v. Hurt' ' was incorrect.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that the requisite state action of a section 1983 claim was an "essential jurisdictional predicate."'' 0 3 The
court viewed immunity, on the other hand, as an affirmative defense to
0
be raised only after subject matter jurisdiction has been established.' 4
In sum, the Seventh Circuit found it necessary to settle the state action
question to determine jurisdiction before considering a grant of immu0 5

nity. 1

Following this approach, the court determined that the state action
question in Robinson was whether the public defender, as a state em94. The Seventh Circuit cited its opinion in John v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973). 579
F.2d at 403.
95. Robinson v. Bergstrom, No. 73-1401 (7th Cir. March 12, 1974) (unpublished order vacating and remanding cause for hearing).
96. Robinson v. Bergstrom, No. CV 73-85-E (May 15, 1974) (unpublished opinion).
97. See note 105 infra.
98. 549 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1977).
99. 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1977).
100. 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
101. 489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973).
102. 579 F.2d at 403-04.
103. Id. at 404.
104. Id. The court cited Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) and Larsen v. Gibson, 267
F.2d 386 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,361 U.S. 848 (1959) for this proposition although neither of these
cases mentions the prior establishment of state action as an "essential jurisdictional predicate."
105. What the Seventh Circuit in Robinson meant by the "incorrect" application of absolute
immunity before determining the requisite state action is unclear. The process used by the courts
in Miller, Minns and Brown may be incorrect analytically, but it is not incorrect procedurally.
Courts may wish to pass over the difficult constitutional state action question and simply apply
absolute immunity. Such a procedure might be improper where the court could not have found
state action because jurisdiction would be lacking, see Miller v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648 (9th Cir.
1977), but the Seventh Circuit in John presumed state action on the part of the public defender,
489 F.2d at 788. In using either process, the result is the same: absolute immunity for the
public defender.
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ployee who maintains a private attorney-client relationship, acts under
color of state law. ,06 The court concluded that only if the private function of representing the indigent overrides the public defender's state
employment may the public defender be found not to act under color
of state law for section 1983 purposes.'0 7 For the purpose of analysis,
the court found it necessary to cursorily review "state action" as applied to a state employee who maintains a private function as a part of
the state employment. 0 8
The Seventh Circuit found the state action "nexus test" enunciated
by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison
Co. 109 to be improper in the context of the public defender."10 The
Jackson test is "whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action
of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself."'I The
Robinson court rejected this test as applied to the public defender since
there would not be the required close nexus between the state and the
public defender's action in representing the indigent client." 12
The court then turned to another state action test based on Burton
v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority. 1 3 In Burton, the United States Supreme Court held that when the state leases its property to a private
4
individual, state action may be found on the part of that individual."
The holding in Burton was narrow and confined to the facts of the
case." 5 However, Burton has been interpreted to find state action
where there is explicit statutory authorization that a private entity act
as an agent of the state" 16 and where the private entity is statutorily a
state instrumentality and a state related institution.' 17 Thus, the con106. 579 F.2d at 405.
107.

Id.

108. Id See generally Black, Foreword-State Action, Equal Protection,and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967); Note, State Action in the Seventh Circuit, 59 MARQ. L. REV.
809 (1976).
109. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
110. 579 F.2d at 406.
111. 419 U.S. at351.
112. The court stated:
The 'nexus' test requires not only proof of significant state regulation but also that there
be a sufficiently close nexus between the challenged action and the state. If this test is
applied in the public defender context it is possible, because of the latter requirement,
that a public defender could be held not to be acting under color of state law.
579 F.2d at 406.
113. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
114. Id. at 726.
115. Id.
116. See Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 545 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1976) (explicit statutory
authorization that library act as agent for the state).
117. See Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (university
statutorily a state-related institution).
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cept set forth in Burton has been judicially expanded into a Burton
"test" for state action.
This Burton "test" for state action has been utilized recently by the
Third Circuit, in Chalfant v. Wilmington Institute, 1 8 where the court
held that the uncompensated, "private citizen"' 19 board members of a
public library were acting under color of state law because the library
was substantially funded by the state.' 20 The court concluded that to
find state action, the status of the individual actor is irrelevant as long
as the institution on whose behalf the actor serves is found to be an
instrumentality of a state or local government. '21 In Chalfant, the public library was created and funded by state statute and located on cityowned property. The Seventh Circuit, in Robinson, adopted the Third
Circuit's approach to the state action question. The court determined
the public defender's private attorney-client relationship to be irrelevant since the public defender office was statutorily created and publicly compensated and the public defender acted on behalf of a state
22
instrumentality. 1
Having established that Bergstrom had acted under color of state
law when he failed to prosecute Robinson's appeal, the Seventh Circuit
proceeded to the immunity issue. The court began by noting that its
decision in John v. Hurt 12 3 granted qualified immunity to the public
defender. 24 However, the court found that since its opinion, in John,
had analogized public defender immunity to that of state prosecutors,
the intervening United States Supreme Court decision in Imbler v.
26
Pachtman125 was controlling.1
In its Imbler analysis, the United States Supreme Court utilized a
two step inquiry to determine whether to apply absolute immunity to a
section 1983 claim. The first inquiry considered the type of immunity
118. 574 F.2d 739, 745 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc).
119. Id. at 741.
120. The public library, in Chafant, received ninety percent of its funding from the state. Id.
at 745.
121. 1d.
122. The Seventh Circuit, in Robinson, found the public defender to be:
as much, if not more, of an instrumentality of the state as the library in Cha/fant...
In view of the office's inextricable relation to the state, no proof that the challenged acts
are related to the state is necessary. The fact that the Public Defender is a state instrumentality is sufficient to show state action.
579 F.2d at 407-08.
123. 489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973).
124. 579 F.2d at 403.
125. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
126. The Seventh Circuit recognized that the Fourth and Ninth Circuits had already applied
1mbler to the public defender inMinns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976) and Miller v. Barilla,
549 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1977). 579 F.2d at 408.
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historically accorded to the official. 127 The Seventh Circuit, however,
was unable to make such an inquiry in Robinson with regard to the
public defender because the position was "a creature of recent origin,
the outgrowth . . . of.

.

. Gideon v. Wainwright."'128 The court then

turned to what it considered to be the "more heavily stressed"'' 29 inquiry in Imbler which dealt with the public policy considerations of the
recruitment and performance of the state prosecutor. Here, the Seventh Circuit found that since its own public policy reasoning, in John v.
Hurt, 30 was based on the type of immunity granted state prosecutors,
Imbler's public policy considerations favored extending absolute immunity to public defenders.' 3' The court, in Robinson, also was concerned with the possibility of frivolous section 1983 claims, as in Minns
v. Paul,132 which might hinder the public defender in carrying out his
or her duties. Thus, the court extended absolute immunity to the pub33
lic defender in a section 1983 action.
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the grant of absolute immunity might create less incentive for the public defender to provide
the most effective defense for the indigent client. 34 But the court noted
that such behavior would be deterred by professional sanctions 35 and
the possibility of charges brought against the public defender based on
18 U.S.C. § 242,136 the criminal counterpart to section 1983. Finally,
realizing that its decision in Robinson would preclude successful section
1983 actions against public defenders, the court listed a number of alternatives available to the indigent client absent a viable section 1983
claim. These alternatives were a tort action based on attorney malpractice, criminal charges under section 242, the filing of a writ of habeas
127. In lmbler, the United States Supreme Court found a well-settled rule of immunity for
state prosecutors extending back to 1896. 424 U.S. at 420-21. See Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind.
117, 44 N.E. 1001 (1896).
128. 579 F.2d at 409.

129. Id.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973). See text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.
579 F.2d at 410.
542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976).
579 F.2d at 410.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 410. See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY No. 7.

135.
136. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as section 2421 is the criminal counterpart
to section 1983. Section 242 provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties on account of such an
inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color or race, than are prescribed for the
punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisonment not more
than one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term
of years or for life.
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corpus in federal court and raising the issue of ineffective counsel in a
137
motion for a new trial or on appeal.
ANALYSIS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT OPINION

The Seventh Circuit properly rearranged the traditional judicial
inquiry into a section 1983 claim against a public defender. Following
the procedure established in Robinson v. Bergstrom, 3 8 the courts
should first determine that they have jurisdiction over the case before
they consider whether to apply immunity to a section 1983 claim.
Otherwise, immunity is apt to be erroneously applied in a situation
where the defendant who is not acting under color of state law could
not be held liable in the first place. 39 Thus, the Seventh Circuit correctly confronted the state action question before addressing the immunity issue.
Traditionally, the courts have not found state action on the part of
the public defender. 40 The Seventh Circuit, in Robinson, however,
was correct to emphasize the public defender's state employment and
thus apply two major state action tests. The state action test set forth in
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 141 was not helpful because there
would never be the required close nexus between the state and the public defender's acts in representing the indigent client. 42 In fact, the
application of the Jackson test would have required focusing exclusively on the private nature of the attorney-client relationship where it
might have been concluded that the public defender had no ties to the
state and thus was completely outside the scope of state action. Therefore, the court in Robinson correctly applied the state action test based
on Burton P. Wilmington ParkingAuthority 14 3 to find that the individual
need only be a state instrumentality to satisfy the necessary state action
for section 1983 purposes. The fact that the official conduct of the public defender is not absolutely controlled by the state should not preclude a finding of state action. Thus, the court correctly concluded that
the public defender acts under color of state law for section 1983 purposes when representing the indigent client.
Unfortunately, the court's application of absolute immunity to the
137. 579 F.2d at 410-11.
138. 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
139. See note 105 supra.
140. See notes 29-36 supra and accompanying text.
141. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
142. See notes 109-12 supra and accompanying text for explanation of the Jackson state action test as applied in Robinson.
143. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See notes 113-22 supra and accompanying text for explanation of
the Burton state action test as applied in Robinson.
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public defender is not as well-reasoned as is its discussion of state action. In John v. Hurt,'44 the Seventh Circuit granted the public defender the more limited qualified immunity. The court abandoned this
conservatism, in Robinson, to follow the Fourth and Ninth Circuits 45
in deciding that since the United States Supreme Court has given absolute immunity to the state prosecutor, the public defender should receive it as well.
The analogy between the state prosecutor and the public defender
is a tenuous one. Because the state prosecutor has the ability to partially control so-called questions of guilt and innocence' 46 by deciding
whom to indict, prosecute, and bring to trial, the state prosecutor does
perform some quasi-judicial functions. Consequently, the state prosecutor is accorded quasi-judicial immunity. The public defender, on the
other hand, performs none of these quasi-judicial functions. Of course,
the public defender exercises some discretion in regard to trial strategy,
witnesses, and the like. However, these duties are comparable to those
of the private attorney and are not akin to the quasi-judicial function of
the state prosecutor.
Indeed, the office of public defender was created solely to provide
representation for indigent clients who would otherwise be without
counsel. Thus, the loyalty, duty, and energy of the public defender
should go towards the defense of the indigent client. With the grant of
quasi-judicial immunity, the public defender becomes an absolutely
immune arm of the state acting in concert with the judge and prosecutor rather than an attorney representing a client. The grant of qualified
immunity, on the other hand, would protect amply the public defender's official conduct of representing the indigent client when performed in good faith but, at the same time, retain for that client a
47
section 1983 action should the elements for such a claim be present.'
The Seventh Circuit noted the public policy considerations of recruitment and performance set forth in Imbler and John in support of
the extension of absolute immunity to the public defender. 4 8 While
these public policy considerations are generally sound, they are not applicable to the facts in Robinson. In Robinson, Bergstrom failed for five
and one half years to process Robinson's appeal. Bergstrom's behavior
is not the sort of professional decision-making which the grant of abso144.
145.
1976).
146.
147.
148.

489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973).
Miller v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1977) and Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 426 (1976).
See notes 50-54 supra and accompanying text.
See 489 F.2d at 788.
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lute immunity is intended to protect. There is no public policy to encourage public defenders to accept indigent clients whom the public
49
defender either cannot or will not responsibly represent.'
The facts, in Robinson, also refute the "frivolous" section 1983
claim argument used to support the grant of absolute immunity. 50
Certainly, in recent years there has been an increase in section 1983
claims against public defenders' 5' and several of these claims have
been deemed to be frivolous by the courts. 52 Yet, the grant of absolute
immunity effectively closes off potentially valid section 1983 claims.
This grant of absolute immunity to the public defender for fear of frivolous claims by indigent clients is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of section 1983 to make liable every person who under color of
state law deprives another of constitutional rights. 5 3 Although a grant
of qualified immunity would place a burden on the public defender to
defend against a section 1983 claim, on balance this alternative is preferable to the blanket grant of absolute immunity. The burden should
be on the states to insure that their mandated public defender offices
are fully staffed to meet the demands of indigent client representation
rather than on the client whose status as an indigent forces him or her
to rely on the state-created public defender.
The court, in Robinson, suggested several possible alternatives 54
for the indigent client other than a section 1983 claim. 5 5 The suggestions were a tort action based on attorney malpractice, a section 242
charge, a writ of habeas corpus, and raising the issue of ineffective
counsel in a motion for a new trial or on appeal. These suggested alternatives simply are not that feasible for an indigent client.
A tort claim based on attorney malpractice 56 against the public
149. Although the public defender has an assigned caseload, the public defender may withdraw from an indigent client's case. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
150. See notes 70-73 and 132 supra and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976). The number of section 1983 claims
as a whole has increased dramatically in recent years. See generally Developments in the
Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1135 (1977).
152. See Miller v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1977) and Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th
Cir. 1976). See generally Comment, Section 1983 and the New Supreme Court: Cutting the Civil
Rights Act Down to Size, 15 DuQ. L. REV. 49 (1976).
153. See note 2 supra for the text of section 1983.
154. See generally Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (pro se complaint). For background on alternate remedies available against a public defender, see Note, 60 MINN. L. REV. 123
(1973); Note, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 457 (1977).

155. 579 F.2d at 410.
156. For background on a tort claim based on attorney malpractice in the section 1983 context, see Mallen, The Court Appointed Lawyer and Legal Malpractice-Liabilityor Immunity, 14
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 59 (1976); Comment, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1420 (1975). For a discussion as to
whether tort concepts as a whole should be applied to section 1983 claims, see Nahmod, Section
1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974).
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defender is generally of little use to the indigent who could not
financially afford to retain private counsel in the first place. There is,
however, the possibility of such an action being brought on a contingent fee basis. 5 7 Whether a public defender can be held liable in a tort
action based on attorney malpractice depends upon the type of tort immunity, if any, granted to the public defender under state law.' 58 In
Illinois, where Robinson would presumably bring suit against Bergstrom, a public defender would apparently be immune from such a tort
claim for the same reasons that a public defender is immune from a
section 1983 suit. 159
A criminal charge against the public defender based on section
242,160 the criminal counterpart to section 1983, is also of little value to
most indigent clients because of three prerequisites to the charge. The
section 242 charge must be founded on the public defender's willful
intent to deprive the indigent of constitutional rights' 6 ' based on the
indigent's alienage, race or color 162 and brought by a federal grand jury
or attorney general. 63 Obviously, these provisions severely limit the
applicability of section 242.' 64 In fact, the Seventh Circuit, in
Robinson, noted that Robinson could not bring a section 242 charge
65
against Bergstrom. 1
A writ of habeas corpus may not be filed in federal court until all
state remedies are exhausted.' 66 As seen in Robinson, a writ of habeas
corpus is not an effective alternative where the public defender representing the indigent client does not exhaust all state remedies. Thus, an
indigent client desiring to file a writ of habeas corpus because of misrepresentation or deprivation of a constitutional right by the public defender may be denied the writ because that same public defender has
failed to exhaust all of the indigent's state remedies.
157. See Fletcher v. Hook, 446 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1971); Ehn v. Price, 372 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. 111.
1974).
158. Therefore, to determine the public defender's liability under an attorney malpractice action, the state law with regard to the potential immunity of the public defender must be determined.
159. See Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1973) (dicta) (applying Illinois law).
160. See note 136 supra for the text of section 242.
161. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Senak, 477 F.2d 304
(7th Cir. 1973).
162. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
163. See Kennedy v. Anderson, 373 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
164. However, section 242 charges have been brought against the public defender. See United
States v. Senak, 477 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1973) (section 242 charges upheld against public defender
charged with exacting fees from indigent client by threatening inadequate legal representation).
165. 579 F.2d at 411. The Seventh Circuit mentions only the "intentional" aspect of a section
242 charge without, apparently, realizing that there are two additional requirements for such a
charge.
166. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474 (1976).
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Raising the issue of attorney misrepresentation in a motion for a
new trial or on appeal may eventually secure a new trial or appeal for
the indigent client, but these two alternatives certainly do not attempt
to compensate the indigent client for a deprivation of a constitutional
right at the hands of an incompetent public defender. 67 In the
Robinson case itself, Robinson was forced to wait five and one half
years for his appeal because the public defender failed to process the
appeal. 168
Thus, the alternatives to a section 1983 claim suggested by the Seventh Circuit are not particularly feasible for the indigent client. The
grant of absolute immunity to the public defender, which precludes a
viable section 1983 claim, leaves the indigent client with few alternatives. The grant of qualified immunity, on the other hand, would protect the public defender's official acts performed in good faith yet allow
the indigent client a claim under section 1983 should the elements for
such a claim be present. Otherwise, those individuals in Robinson's
position who are forced to wait five and one half years between conviction and appeal will be without remedy.
CONCLUSION

Section 1983 was enacted by Congress to ensure that no one who
acts under color of state law can deprive an individual of constitutional
rights or privileges. While the courts have allowed the defense of immunity to be used at times to defeat such claims, the fundamental reasons for section 1983 remain and should not be undermined by the
wholesale application of absolute immunity.
The Seventh Circuit, in Robinson v. Bergstrom, presented a wellreasoned discussion in favor of finding state action on the part of the
public defender. In so doing, the court held out hope to the indigent
client who is otherwise without a viable remedy against the public defender. Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit's grant of absolute immunity to the public defender is misapplied, making the court's persuasive
state action decision only an empty gesture to the indigent client. A
grant of qualified immunity by the Seventh Circuit would have pro167. See generally Bailey, The Realities of Prisoners' Cases Under 42 U.S.C § 1983. A Statistical Survey in the Northern District of Illinois, 6 Loy. CHI. L.J. 527 (1975); Margolin & Wagner, The
Indigent Criminal Defendant and Defense Services. A Searchfor Constitutional Standards, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 647 (1973).
168. For a discussion as to damages the indigent might receive in a section 1983 action, see
Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972).
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tected amply those public defenders who perform their duties in good
faith, as well as preserve an effective remedy against those who do not.
DELILAH BRUMMET

